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Coercion of Third Parties In Labor
Disputes--The Secondary Boycott
J. DENSON SMITH*
If A assaults B while the latter is walking down the street,
ordinarily no one but B can complain. However, if B is on his
way to C's store to make a purchase and A's assault causes C to
lose a sale, the latter's position must be considered. The mere
fact that the wrong committed against the prospective customer
results in the store owner's losing a sale would, we may agree,
not be a sufficient showing to entitle the latter to any relief, but
a different situation would be presented if the owner could show
that the act directed against the third party was used as a means
of injuring him.' If we assume, therefore, that a labor union is
having a legitimate dispute with an employer, and, believing that
if it can divert his patronage it may force him to accede to the
union demands, successfully commits a personal attack on a prospective customer, the question is, does this attack on the customer
infringe the emPloyer's legal rights? Before seeking an answer to
this question, let us suppose that, instead of resorting to violence,
the union undertakes peacefully to persuade the customer not to
favor the employer with his patronage. We must then inquire
whether peaceful persuasion will violate the latter's legal rights.
In proceeding to solve these problems two primary questions
arise. First, is the matter of compulsion directed at the employer,
and second, compulsion directed at the third party.
Undoubtedly, any compulsion directed at the employer may
result in a serious interference with his liberty of action. But we
now know that the liberty which he enjoys in the conduct of his
business is not unlimited with respect to labor. Merely that he
may be compelled by the conduct of the union to grant concessions which otherwise he would not grant is not enough to entitle
him to any relief. This means, of course, that the union is legally
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. For a discussion of the significance of motive see Holmes, Privilege,
Malice and Intent (1894) 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1; Ames, How Far an Act may be a
Tort because of Wrongful Motive of the Actor (1905) 18 Harv. L. Rev. 411;

Walton, Motive as an Element in Torts in the Common and in the Civil Law
(1909) 22 Harv. L. Rev. 501; Lewis, Should the Motive of the Defendant Affect

the Question of his Liability (1905) 5 Col. L. Rev. 107.
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privileged to destroy, if it can, the employer's freedom of choice
between granting its legitimate demands or rejecting them, a
privilege which rests on the feeling that the struggle between employers and employees is but one aspect of the theory of free comto conduct his business
petition to which any individual's liberty
2
as he sees fit is constantly subjected.
If conduct which may compel an employer to act against his
will may be justifiable, this raises the question whether there are
any limits to the manner in which such compulsion may be
brought about. More particularly the inquiry would be whether
in seeking to compel the employer the union may undertake to
divert his customers. However, to avoid an unnecessary limitation, other attacks on his business should be included, for having
customers is not the only contact necessary to its successful
prosecution. For him to have available sources from which he can
draw his raw materials and his labor is perhaps just as necessary,
and a thrust at these sources may interfere with his business and
his liberty just as much as diversion of his patronage. The attack,
in all these cases, would be centered on his business contacts, his
markets, and would constitute an effort to stifle them. In keeping
with the practice where attempts to cut off patronage are involved, the term "boycott" may be applied appropriately to conduct of the kind indicated, for he is "boycotted" just as clearly
when an effort is made to destroy his labor market or the source
on which he depends for raw materials as he is when the attempt
is to cut off his supply of customers.8
Returning to the question concerning the kind of compulsion
that may be used against the employer, the legality of peaceful
persuasion, whether it is directed at employees or those having
other business dealings with him, present or prospective, is no
longer open to serious question. 4 If peaceful persuasion is thus
2. See Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930) ch. 1, where
the authorities are collected.
3. "The boycott may, therefore, be defined as a combination formed for
the purpose of restricting the markets of an individual or group of individuals." Wolman, The Boycott in American Trade Unions, 34 Johns Hopkins
University Studies (1916) 9, 12. For a consideration of other definitions of
the term see, id. at 10, 11; Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 2
at 42, 43; Sayre, Labor and the Courts (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 682, 699. In Gill
Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. 111, 119 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914), Hough, J.,
remarked, "I do not perceive any distinction upon which a legal difference of
treatment should be based between a lockout, a strike, and a boycott. They
often look very unlike, but this litigation illustrates their basic identity. All
are voluntary abstentions from acts which normal persons usually perform
for mutual benefit. .. ."
4. See, particularly, American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
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eliminated our question is reduced to the legality of an attempt to
compel third parties to act against the employer. In the light of
the finding that the latter is not free from coercive practices, why
his case should be any different if the third person is compelled,
rather than persuaded, not to deal with him, may be wondered.
Clearly, as far as the employer is concerned, whether peaceful
persuasion or personal assault is employed, the result, if accomplished, will be exactly the same. He will lose a sale. However,
the obvious difference between persuasion and compulsion is that
in the first case nothing occurs to deprive the customer of voluntarily choosing between buying and not buying from the offending employer, whereas in the second the assault is an obstacle to
the exercise by the former of a free will in the matter. In short,
peaceful persuasion does not interfere with the customer's liberty
but compulsion does. Yet how does this concern the employer?
Granting that, in order for a court of equity to be justified in
issuing an injunction to restrain a combined attempt to interfere
with one's liberty, there must be a finding that the end sought is
unlawful or the means employed are unlawful, then, if the employer is allowed to complain of the union's assault on the customer, one of these elements must be present. The scope of this
paper does not permit of a general inquiry concerning the ends
for which labor may employ its weapons. The lawfulness of the
end with respect to the party with whom the dispute exists will
therefore, in general, be assumed. The present inquiry is thus narrowed to the legal nature of the means. Although a personal assault has been used in the illustration, it may be well to recognize
at this time that violence of any kind has no proper place in a
labor dispute as is generally true of the whole field of the law. The
same, of course, can be said of fraud or misrepresentation. The
removal of these methods of attack leaves available for consideration only conduct that is honest and peaceful. In order, therefore,
to make the illustrative case more useful the assault must be elimCouncil, 257 U.S. 184, 209, 42 S.Ct. 72, 66 L.Ed. 189 (1921); My Maryland Lodge
No. 186 of Machinists v. Adt., 100 Md. 238, 59 Atl. 721, 68 L.R.A. 752 (1905); Beck
v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N.W. 13, 42 L.R.A.
407, 74 Am. St. Rep. 421 (1898); Perfect Laundry Co. v. Marsh, 120 N.J. Eq.
508, 186 Atl. 470 (1938); Goldflnger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E. (2d) 910
(1937). See also, Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 2, at 31-34;
Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts (1932) 10 N. C. L. Rev. 158;
Eskin, The Legality of "Peaceful Coercion" in Labor Disputes (1937) 85 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 456; and Note (1920) 6 A.L.R. 909, where the cases are collected. Of
course, some courts refuse to believe there can be such a thing as peaceful
picketing. See generally, Sayre, Labor and the Courts (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 682,
701, 703; Cooper, The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing (1936) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 73.
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inated and some form of non-violent compulsion substituted. Obviously, the third party may be compelled to pursue a certain
course of conduct if the alternative is to suffer some loss. Such a
loss may result from interference with his normal relations and
contacts. Therefore we may assume instead that the union undertakes to compel him to act against the offending employer by
interfering through peaceful means with his normal business relations, such as by undertaking peacefully to divert also his patronage. Having in mind the statement previously made that
peaceful persuasion is legal, if peaceful persuasion of the neutral's
customers is attempted, may it fairly be said that the union is
using unfair means against the employer? It is believed that this
question can and should be answered in the affirmative.
Viewing the problem solely from the standpoint of the neutral, the effort on the part of the union to dissuade prospective
customers from dealing with him constitutes, under the definition
mentioned above, an illegal conspiracy. This is so, because although, as to him, peaceful persuasion of his customers is a lawful
means, the combined interference with his patronage by whatever
means, since he is a neutral, cannot be justified. In short, the conduct lacks a lawful end because there is an absence of any relationship between him and the union members which would justify
them in undertaking to coerce him to do their bidding. 5 And since
interference with his liberty of choice is at once the end of the
attempt to destroy his patronage and the means used to force compliance by the employer, the end from the standpoint of the neutral is the means as to the employer. Therefore, that which is
illegal as an end against the neutral remains illegal as a means
against the employer."
5. Of course this statement will not hold true of the minority jurisdictions
which permit the direct focusing of coercion on a neutral. Empire Theatre v.
Cloke, 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107, L.R.A. 1917E 383 (1917); Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, Local No. 8760, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909). Cf. Geo. J. Grant
Const. Co. v. St. Paul Building Trades Council, 136 Minn. 167, 161 N.W. 520
(1917).
6. This form of analysis, although not clearly stated, may be discovered
in the opinion of Shaw, J., in J. F. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council,
the use of
154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027, 1044, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 550 (1908) "...
undue influence to compel or bring about the action of one person to the
injury of a third person is the use of illegal means to that end (i.e., coercion
The principle
of the customer is an illegal means against the employer) ....
settled by the cases cited, however, is that, while men have a right by that
(lawful) means to coerce their employers (customers of the struck employer)
so as to compel them to act to the injury of a third person . . . it is the control of another's conduct against his will that is the unlawful element in the
proposition (i.e., the end is unlawful). This being unlawful, the resulting
Injury to a third person is unlawful, although every other act in the trans-
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The foregoing, of course, is the legalistic way of saying that,
according to generally prevailing notions, it is socially undesirable
for the employer to have to suffer such tactics and also socially7
undesirable for the third party to be laid open to such attacks.
Perhaps the feeling is that as long as the fight is a fair fight between the union and the employer, may the better man win, but
that non-disputants should be left free to choose their side and
should not be forced to aid in the fight against their will. Freedom to choose is the life of competition for the choice; without it
competition cannot exist. At any rate, that deprivation on the part
of a neutral of freedom of choice, untrammeled by compulsion, is
the essential ingredient of that practice to which the term "secondary boycott" ought to be applied, should here be emphasized.8
This is the practice that the law generally does not countenance.
To approach the problem in such fashion should help to focus the
attention on the character of the acts themselves rather than on
the symbol under which they are outlawed. The law condemns a
particular kind of conduct, whatever its name, not the name itself.9
There does not follow from the foregoing, however, the proposition that whenever pressure is brought to bear on a neutral, in
action is lawful in itself" (i.e., since controlling the conduct of the customer
against his will is unlawful, the resulting injury to the employer is unlawful,
although the conduct involved is lawful per se). It was also used in Parker
Paint and Wall Paper Co. v. Local Union No. 813, 87 W. Va. 631, 105 S.E. 911,
914, 16 A.L.R. 222 (1921): "And the use of such means (peaceful bannering)
against one's customers in order to coerce them to compel him to comply
with demands made on him by the union is an unjustifiable interference with
the rights of such customers. Martin's Mod. Law on Labor Unions 77." See
also, Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3, 45 Fed. 135 (C.C.S.D.
Ohio, 1891); Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 803 (C.C.S.D.
Ohio, 1894); Albro J. Newton Co. v. Erickson, 70 Misc. Rep. 291, 126 N.Y. Supp.
949 (1911). (Matter in parenthesis and italics supplied.)
7. A good statement of this view appears in Iron Moulders' Union No. 125
v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45, 51, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 315 (C.C.A. 7th, 1908).
8. "A boycott may be defined to be a combination of several persons to
cause a loss to a third person by causing others against their will to withdraw from him their beneficial business intercourse through threats that,
unless a compliance with their demands be made, the persons forming this
Intimidation and coercion
combination, will cause loss or injury to him ....
are essential elements of a boycott. It must appear that the means used are
threatening and intended to overcome the will of others and compel them
to do or refrain from doing that which they would or would not otherwise
have done." Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97 N.W. 663, 666, 63
L.R.A. 753, 103 Am. St. Rep. 477 (1903). See also, Meier v. Speer, 96 Ark. 618,
132 S.W. 988, 990-991, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 792 (1910); Bricklayer's, etc. Union v.
Seymour Ruff & Sons, Inc., 160 Md. 483, 154 Atl. 52, 83 A.L.R. 448 (1931); and
Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1067 (1906).
9. "Names are not things. It is the thing done or threatened to be done
that determines the quality of the act, and this quality is not changed by
applying to the acts an opprobrious name or epithet." Caldwell, J., dissenting,
in Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912, 924 (C.C.A. 8th, 1897).
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order indirectly to compel action by an employer, an illegal secondary boycott is involved. The simple case of an individual withholding his patronage from a retailer because the retailer deals
with a manufacturer with whom the individual has a grievance
is an illustration. Clearly, if an individual does not choose to
deal with a retailer because he feels that the support which the
retailer is giving to a manufacturer is an aid to the latter in successfully resisting demands made upon him, or indeed, for whatever reason, the individual acts with legal freedom. But, granting
that this is true, by expanding this method of attack, two principal questions are raised: First, how far may labor combine in a
withdrawal of its own patronage, and secondly, how far may
labor go in inducing others to withdraw their patronage? These
questions, of course, involve the common law conspiracy.
The conspiracy problem cannot be solved by simple logic. Because one individual may be privileged to buy or not to buy from
a particular person, that a number of individuals acting in combination are likewise free to withhold patronage, does not necessarily follow.10 The question here considered is an old one and
has been much discussed since the time when the indictment for
criminal conspiracy was the chief weapon of employers to prevent concerted action on the part of employees.- The problem always is: how can conduct lawful as to an individual become
unlawful merely because participated in by a group or combination
of individuals? Discarding the logical mirage which beckons, the
reason for this is simple enough. Freedom of the individual to
deal or not to deal with whom he chooses, to favor with his patronage or to withhold it, is the bulwark of our philosophy.12 So
10. To pursue such logic will lead to holding a secondary boycott lawful
[Empire Theatre v. Cloke, 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107, L.R.A. 1917E 383 (1917)],
or to an even less tenable position [Alfred W. Booth & Bro. v. Burgess, 72
N.J. Eq. 181, 65 Atl. 226 (1906)).
11. See generally, Brigham, Strikes and Boycotts as Indictable Conspiracies at Common Law (1887) 21 Am. L. Rev. 41; Wyman, The Law as to Boycott
(1903) 15 Green Bag 208; McWilliams, Evolution of the Law Relating to Boycotts (1907) 41 Am. L. Rev. 336; Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy (1922) 35 Harv. L.
Rev. 393; Hellerstein, supra note 4, at 166; Sayre, Labor and the Courts, supra
note 4; Jaffln, Theorems in Anglo-American Law (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 1104;
Pollock, The Law of Torts (10th ed. 1916) 334 et seq.; Note (1920) 6 A. L. R.
909, where a large number of the cases are collected and discussed.
12. Notice that the reference here is to negative conduct, not affirmative.
As to the individual's position with regard to the latter see, Carpenters'
Union v. Citizens' Committee, 333 Ill. 225, 164 N.E. 393, 63 A.L.R. 157 (1928);
Harvey v. Chapman, 226 Mass. 191, 115 N.E. 304, L.R.A. 1917E 389 (1917);
Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union of Minneapolis, 140
Minn. 481, 168 N.W. 766, 3 A.L.R. 1290 (1918); Seubert, Inc. v. Reiff, 98 Misc.
402, 164 N.Y. Supp. 522 (1917); Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400, 16 S.W. 111, 26
Am. St. Rep. 755 (1891). See also Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946,
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essential is it considered that its exercise is open to no inquiry.
Whether the motives which direct the individual's choice would
appeal to the run of men as reasonable or unreasonable, fair or
unfair, is of no importance. They are not to be judged by any
jural standard. Because of this philosophy the individual is said
to enjoy a personal privilege in this regard. But this is a privilege
to act individually. Consequently its existence does not solve the
question of privilege in respect of a combination of individuals.
When concerted action occurs great damage may be done, the
injurious effect of which on society makes necessary a limitation
on the exercise of group freedom. 13 It is quite unnecessary and
logically unsound to identify the individual with the group, to find
in the group nothing but individuals in isolation. Is the bite of a
rattlesnake only the personal conduct of an atom? 14 The harm
which may result from a societal standpoint as a consequence of
action by an individual may be so trifling when weighed against
the individual's personal freedom as not to cause any judicial
alarm, but concerted action may so enlarge its extent that it can
no longer be treated as socially inconsequential. Then an aroused
judiciary begins to establish limits. The additional ingredient
which may be isolated under the term "conspiracy" or "combination" is an aid to delineation but the judicial problem necessarily
calls for a balancing of interests.
Interference with the Third Party's Patronage
Since the problem is one where the interests of labor are to
be weighed against the harm which may occur to another directly,
22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 599 (1909); Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 152 Iowa 618, 132
N.W. 371, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 263 (1911).
13. "Individuals may work for whom they please, and quit work when they
please, provided they do not violate their contract of employment. Combinations of individuals have similar rights, but the liability to injury from the
concerted action of numbers has placed upon their freedom to quit work
these additional qualifications: That their action must be taken for their own
interest, and not for the primary purpose of injuring another or others, and
neither in end sought, nor in means adopted to secure that end, must it be
prohibited by law nor in contravention of public policy." Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers', Masons' & Plasterers' Local Union No. 1, 92 Conn. 161,
101 Atl. 659, 661, 6 A.L.R. 887 (1917).
The opinion in Alfred W. Booth & Bro. v. Burgess, 72 N.J. Eq. 181, 65
Atl. 226 (1906) constitutes almost a reductio ad absurdum of the theory that
conduct which is lawful when pursued by one person cannot be unlawful
when pursued by many in combination. The court was convinced that coercion of a neutral was unfair as to the employer but under the theory it was
forced to uphold, without regard to motive, strikes and threats thereof
against a neutral. However, the court then proceeded to find that it was unlawful for a union agent to notify union men of a rule which required them
to quit work under the circumstances on the ground that such notification
constituted coercion of the union men.
14. Cf. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy (1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 393, 410, 411.
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and society indirectly, as a consequence of combined action, it is
not surprising that there should be a lack of uniformity in the decisions. At the same time, this lack of uniformity is generally
traceable to a difference in emphasis given to one factor over another by the courts which have considered the problem, rather
than to a disagreement on legal fundamentals. 15 As far as the
offending employer is concerned, the refusal of organized labor to
give him its patronage or to purchase his product is a necessary
incident of the labor dispute.1 6 The difficulty arises when there is
a combined withdrawal of patronage from a third person as a consequence of his dealings with the employer.
Here it is necessary to recognize two notions that, although
not inconsistent in theory, sometimes draw close to conflict in
practice. One is that laborers should be privileged to refrain from
doing anything that may be injurious to their cause-that they
are entitled to act in self-defense for their own protection. The
other is that they should not be permitted by force of combination
to injure others outside the immediate dispute in order to compel
assistance in the struggle. In short, on the one hand the belief
that the conduct of labor is necessary to the protection of the
organization prevails over the feeling that it is designed to coerce
non-disputants, while on the other its coercive aspect is considered as its motivating factor. Of course the line is often a shadowy one, but the principle, that labor is not to be permitted to
inflict injury on a third party to force action detrimental to the
employer where its conduct stems from such intention, is generally recognized." With this difference between negative and
positive interference with the third party's liberty in mind, one
may easily see that to justify a combined withdrawal by labor of
general patronage which a retailer would normally enjoy, because
the retailer purchases some of his goods for resale from the dis15. The principle is concisely stated in the opinion of Beatty, C. J., in
J. F. Parkinson v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027, 1036,
21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 550, 16 Ann. Cas. 1165 (1908): "Any injury to a lawful business,

whether the result of a conspiracy or not, is prima facie actionable, but may
be defended upon the ground that it was merely the result of a lawful effort
of the defendants to promote their own welfare."
16. See however, Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912 (C.C.A. 8th,
1897).

This case is not to be approved. Cf. Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Mfrs.

Ass'n, 221 Mass. 554, 109 N.E. 643, L.R.A. 1916C 218 (1915).
17. There are exceptional cases where this distinction is not taken and
action against a neutral which is admitted to be coercive, not merely defensive, is approved. Empire Theatre v. Cloke, 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107, L.R.A.
1917E 383 (1917); See Truax v. Bisbee Local No. 380 C. & W. A., 19 Ariz. 379,
171 Pac. 121 (1918); Pierce v. Stableman's Union, Local No. 8760, 156 Cal. 70,
103 Pac. 324 (1909).
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putant employer, would be exceedingly more difficult than to
justify a combined refusal on the part of labor to purchase any
product of the employer's factory. This is so, simply because a
refusal by labor to purchase "unfair" goods cannot be labelled as
designed to coerce anyone other than the employer. But if labor
combines to withhold general patronage from a retailer because
he carries in stock "unfair" goods, it is not difficult to believe that
labor has more in mind than self-protection, more in mind than
merely that patronizing the retailer would be injurious to the
cause. This distinction has been frequently applied and is the
basis of most cases holding the use of "Unfair" and "We Don't
Patronize" lists illegal. In fine, condemnation of the practice rests
on the feeling that the general retailer does not make himself
a party to the dispute by stocking the manufacturer's product,
and is not thus brought within the permissible area of conflict so
that injury to his business can be justified by the theory of competition.18
18. In Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389, 83 N.E. 928, 929, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 85
(1908) it is said: "It is not wrong for members of a union to cease patronizing
anyone when they regard it for their interest to do so, but they have no right
to compel others to break off business relations with the one from whom
they have withdrawn their patronage, and to do this by unlawful means, with
the motive of injuring such person." And in People v. McFarlin, 43 Misc.
591, 89 N.Y. Supp. 527, 529 (1904) the court said: " . . . I apprehend that in
each case, as it arises, a question for the jury is likely to be presented,
whether the persons accused were only doing what they had the right to do
in bestowing their favor upon their friends, and withholding their business
and beneficial intercourse from those whom they believed to be unfriendly,
or whether, on the other hand, their immediate object and intent were to
injure another in his trade or business .. " These courts are talking about
the same thing which was expressed by Van Orsdel, J., in American Federation
of Labor v. Buck's Stove and Range Co., 33 App. D.C. 83, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 748,
768 (1909), as follows: "No one doubts, I think, the right of the members of the
American Federation of Labor to refuse to patronize employers whom it regards as unfair to labor. It may procure and keep a list of such employers
not only for the use of its members, but as notice to their friends that the
employers whose names appear thereon are regarded as unfair to labor. This
list may not only be procured and kept available for the members of the
association and its friends, but it may be published in a newspaper or series
of papers .... But as soon as, by threats or coercion, they attempt to prevent
others from patronizing a person whose name appears on the list it then
becomes an unlawful conspiracy-a boycott."
Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Hopkins v. Oxley Stave
Co., 83 Fed. 912 (C.C.A. 8th, 1897). See also: Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical
Union No. 3, 45 Fed. 135 (C.C.S.D. Ohio, 1891). Loewe v. California State Federation of Labor, 139 Fed. 71 (C.C.N.D. Cal., 1905), Seattle Brewing and Malting Co. v. Hansen, 144 Fed. 1011 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1905), Rocky Mountain Bell
Telephone Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, 156 Fed. 809 (1907), and
Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 165 N.Y. Supp. 469, 124 N.E. 97, 6 A.L.R. 901
(1919), with J. F. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98
Pac. 1027, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 550, 16 Ann. Cas. 1165 (1908), Pierce v. Stablemen's
Union Local No. 8760, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909), and Lindsay & Co. v.
Montana Federation of Labor, 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 127, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 707,
127 Am. St. Rep. 722 (1908).
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A similar problem is presented when picketing at the place of
business of a third party is resorted to. As previously stated, there
is general agreement that picketing, per se, is lawful as a mode of
peaceful persuasion.19 Although in many cases the buying public
may be appealed to effectively at the establishment where the
dispute is in progress, in the case of a manufacturing plant, picketing at the factory may be utterly fruitless in affecting the sale
of the product manufactured. If the goods manufactured are being retailed to the public elsewhere, then as a matter of common
sense, to be more effective the attack on such goods should center
at the place where the retailing is going on. This may lead the
union to establish pickets at the retailer's place of business. If
such picketing amounts to no more than an attempt to notify the
public of the dispute with the manufacturer and an appeal not
to buy his product, it may easily and appropriately be considered
as merely designed to enlighten prospective purchasers in the
hope that they may see fit to pass up the product. But the objection to this practice is that it may have a coercive effect on the
retailer. Here again, however, a distinction is necessary between
the incidental and the intentional. Obviously enough, if the picketing is successful, the retailer may be compelled in self-protection to cease stocking the manufacturer's product. However,
exactly the same thing would happen if picketing at the manufactory alone should be sufficient. Yet no one would suppose in the
latter case that the manufacturer would be entitled to relief merely because the picketing at the factory was successful in stopping
retail sales elsewhere. Therefore, those courts that recognize the
legality of picketing of this kind at the place where the goods
are retailed are taking the proper view of the matter."0
When, however, the picketing at the retailer's place of business goes beyond an effort merely to acquaint the public with
the fact that a particular product which is there being sold is unfair, and takes on the color of an effort to dissuade the public
from dealing generally with the retailer, the coercive effect is not
merely incidental.2 1 Here the union is seeking to compel him to
19. See note 4, supra.
20. See Goldflnger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E. (2d) 910 (1937);
Engelmeyer v. Simon, 148 Misc. 621, 265 N.Y. Supp. 636 (1933).
21. See for example, Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper Guild, 122 N.J. Eq. 545, 195 Atl. 378 (1937), Mitnick v. Furniture Workers' Union Local No. 66, C.I.O. of City of Newark, 200 At. 553 (N.J.
Ch. 1938), and A. Fink & Son v. Butcher's Union No. 422, of Newark, 84 N.J.
Eq. 638, 95 At. 182 (1915), where such practices were resorted to. See also,
Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Hansen, 144 Fed. 1011 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1905);
Parker Paint & Wall Paper Co. v. Local Union No. 813, 87 W. Va. 631, 105
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stop dealing with the manufacturer by threatening him with financial ruin if he persists. It is undertaking by compulsion to
force the retailer to actually take its side in the conflict. Even
liberal courts, such as those of New York, balk at favoring such
tactics with their approval. 22 The essential kinship between action of this kind and picketing of such a nature as to intimidate
prospective customers is readily perceptible. That is, violent picketing deprives prospective customers of the ability to choose freely between buying and not buying, just like the threatened injury
to the retailer's business by the general picketing of his establishment is calculated to destroy his free choice. 23 And herein
rests the real foundation, such as it is, for those decisions that
have found picketing itself-such as in front of a restaurantunlawful.2 4 Such courts have been ready to believe that any pickS.E. 911, 16 A.L.R. 222 (1921), in the latter of which picketing a store because
it contracted with a nonunion master painter to paint the building was enjoined as unfair.
22. Commercial House and Window Cleaning Co. v. Awerkin, 138 Misc.
512, 240 N.Y. Supp. 797 (1930); George F. Stuhmer & Co. v. Kroman, 241 App.
Div. 702, 269 N.Y. Supp. 788 (1934), aff'd without opinion 265 N.Y. 481, 193 N.E.
281 (1934); Grandview Dairy v. O'Leary, 158 Misc. 791, 285 N.Y. Supp. 841
(Sup. Ct. 1936); Mlle. Reif, Inc. v. Randau, 166 Misc. 247, 1 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 515
(Sup. Ct. 1937); B. Gertz, Inc. v. Randau, 162 Misc. 786, 295 N.Y. Supp. 871
(Sup. Ct. 1937); See Goldflnger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 282, 11 N.E. (2d)
910, 912 (1937): "Likewise it is illegal to picket the place of business of one
who is not himself a party to an industrial dispute to persuade the public
to withdraw its patronage generally from the business for the purpose of
causing the owner to take sides in a controversy in which he has no interest."
(Italics supplied.) Cf. Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690, 73 A.L.R.
699 (1931). The distinction between this case and the Awerkin case is that the
dispute in the latter was not with the owner of the establishment being picketed but was with the employer of the window cleaners over his refusal to
hire union men on his contracts, whereas in the Nann case the dispute was
with the owner of the picketed store. Contra: Hydrox Ice Cream Co. v. Doe,
293 N.Y. Supp. 1013 (1937); Manhattan Steam Bakery v. Schindler, 250 App.
Div. 467, 294 N.Y. Supp. 783 (1937); Davega-City Radio, Inc. v. Randau, 166
Misc. 246, 1 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 514 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
Obviously, if picketing a store generally because it stocks a nonunion
product is unlawful, picketing an establishment because it has erected a
nonunion sign would be unlawful. Canepa v. "John Doe", 277 N.Y. 52, 12 N.E.
(2d) 790 (1938); Weil & Co. v. Doe, 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 559 (Sup. Ct. 1938). Contra:
American Gas Stations Inc. v. Doe, 250 App. Div. 227, 293 N.Y. Supp. 1019
(Sup. Ct. 1937). Nor would the fact that the placard stated only that the
sign was unfair-not the store-make any difference because merely announcing the sign as unfair, it not being for sale, could have no other purpose than to injure the store owner.
23. For a very good statement of this view see Remington Rand, Inc. v.
Crofoot, 248 App. Div. 356, 289 N.Y. Supp. 1025 (1936), aff'd by memorandum
opinion, 18 N.E. (2d) 37 (Ct. App. 1938).
24. Local Union No. 313, Hotel and Restaurant Employes' International
Alliance v. Stathakis, 135 Ark. 86, 205 S.W. 450, 6 A.L.R. 894, (1918); Moore v.
Cooks' Waiters' & Waitresses' Union No. 402, 39 Cal. App. 538, 179 Pac. 417
(1919); Robison v. Hotel & Restaurant Employee's Local No. 782, 35 Idaho
418, 207 Pac. 132, 27 A.L.R. 642 (1922); Webb v. Cooks', Waiters' and Waitresses' Unions No. 748, 205 S.W. 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); St. Germain v.
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eting destroys the possibility of the customer's deciding for himself which side he will favor. 25 However, courts that give substance and weight to the belief that a prospective customer might
be unable to stand the publicity which might attend patronizing
a place being picketed are overlooking the fact that this kind of
coercion, if existent, is merely a necessary incident of any effort
to acquaint the public, by picketing-which is perhaps the only
available means--of the labor controversy. And when weighed
against the interests of the union the possible or obvious coercive
effect of picketing without suggestion of violence or retaliation
should not be allowed to control.
This is also believed to be the underlying consideration that
fathered the "unity of interest" idea found in a leading and recent
New York case which involved picketing at a retailer's place of
business. 26 This case, however, is not the first where this theory
has found expression. It had previously been employed to justify
striking against an establishment other than the one involved in
the dispute because the offender was having some of his work
done at the establishment in question. 27 The New York court undoubtedly had in mind the coercive effect on the retailer of such
Bakery and Conf. Workers' Union No. 9 of Seattle, 97 Wash. 282, 166 Pac.
665, L.R.A. 1917F 824 (1917). See also, Rosenberg v. Retail Clerks' Ass'n Local

428, 89 Cal.-App. 67, 177 Pac. 864 (1918); Ellis v. Journeyman Barbers' International Union of America, Local No. 52, 194 Iowa 1179, 191 N.W. 111, 32
A.L.R. 756 (1922); Elkind & Sons v. Retail Clerks International Protective
Ass'n, 114 N.J. Ch. 586, 169 Atl. 494 (1933); Bomes v. Providence Local No. 223
of Motion Picture Mach. Operators of U. S. and Canada, 51 R.I. 499, 155 Atl.
581 (1931). But cf. Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of Silk
Workers, 116 N.J. Eq. 146, 172 Atl. 551, 92 A.L.R. 1450 (1934); Perfect Laundry

Co. v. Marsh, 120 N.J. Eq. 508, 186 Atl. 470 (1936); Kirmse v. Adler, 311 Pa.
78, 166 Atl. 566 (1933).
25. This statement is applicable also to picketing designed to interfere
with the flow of labor. But some courts seem to make a distinction between
the two types which is of doubtful validity. Compare Cooks', Waiters' and
Waitresses' Local Union v. Papageorge, 230 S.W. 1086 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921),
with International Ladies' Garment Worker's Local Union No. 123 v. Dorothy
Frocks, 95 S.W. (2d) 1846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), and International Ass'n of
Machinists Union, Local No. 1488 v. Federated Ass'n of Accessory Workers,
109 S.W. (2d) 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). See also, Robison v. Hotel Restaurant
Employees Local No. 782, 35 Idaho 418, 207 Pac. 132 (1922).
26. Goldflnger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E. (2d) 910 (1937). The act
considered in the opinion may have had some bearing on this theory.
27. Iron Moulders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co. No. 125, 166 Fed. 45, 20
L.R.A. (N.S.) 315 (C.C.A. 7th, 1908); Searle Mfg. Co. v. Terry, 56 Misc. 265,

106 N.Y. Supp. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1905). See also, Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214
Fed. 111 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1914). But see, Vonnegut Machinery Co. v. Toledo
Machine and Tool Co., 263 Fed. 192 (D.C.N.D. Ohio 1920), reversed for lack
of jurisdiction, 274 Fed. 66 (1921); Schlang v. Ladies' Waist Makers Union,
Local 25, 67 Misc. 221, 124 N.Y. Supp. 289 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Pacific Typesetting

Co. v. International Typographical Union, 125 Wash. 278, 216 Pac. 858, 32
A.L.R. 767 (1923).

1939]

SECONDARY BOYCOTT

picketing and, in order to justify the union's conduct notwithstanding, it emphasized the connection or relationship between
manufacturer and retailer. The court's realism in recognizing the
possibility of coercion is hardly open to question, but admitting
its propriety by means of the suggested theory is of doubtful advisability. The principle applied seems to be that coercion directed at others than the immediate employer may be permissible
in some cases, the test to consist of a finding of "unity of interest."
If there is validity to this concept, however, it should justify
direct coercion of the retailer, not only coercion which may be a
necessary incident of a direct attack on the goods of the manufacturer at the point of absorption by the public. Yet the court was
clear enough in indicating that it would not approve direct coercion.2 8 This being so, the sounder view would be to justify such
picketing as merely a necessary attempt to center the attack on
the employer's goods at the point where it would have the great29
est effect on the buying public.
Interference with the Third Party's Employment Relations
When the "buying public" happens to be other industrialists
who utilize the manufactured product in their trades, the method
usually resorted to for the purpose of destroying the employer's
market has as its prime factor the provoking of labor troubles.
The problems which result from activity of this kind are counterparts of those just considered. The difficulty always comes in
trying to separate conduct which, in the light of the existing dispute, may be considered as reasonably necessary for the protection of the policy initiated against the offending employer, from
that which goes beyond cooperation and amounts to the attempted
28. "We do not hold more than that, where a retailer is in unity of interest with the manufacturer, the union may follow the nonunion goods and
seek by peaceful picketing to persuade the consuming public to refrain from
purchasing the nonunion product, whether that is at the plant of the manufacturer or at the store of the retailer in the same line of business and in
unity of interest with the manufacturer." Goldflnger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y.
281, 11 N.E. (2d) 910, 913 (1937). (Italics supplied.)
29. The concurring opinion of Judge Lehman, with which Judge Loughran was in accord, seems the sounder: "I agree that peaceful picketing of
the plaintiff's place of business by the defendant union for the purpose of
inducing the plaintiff's customers to refrain from buying nonunion products
of a manufacturer, which are on sale by the plaintiff, is lawful. That is not
a 'secondary boycott'. . . . I agree, too, that the union would be acting unlawfully if it picketed the plaintiff's place of business in manner calculated
to impede or intimidate customers of the plaintiff, or if the union attempted
to coerce the plaintiff, by other unlawful acts or by threat of injury to his
business, except as such injury might result by the use, by the union, of lawful means to achieve a lawful end." Goldflnger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11
N.E. (2d) 910, 914-915 (1937). (Italics supplied.)
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coercion of third parties. No progress is made by thinking in
terms of "sympathetic strikes."
Coercion in cases of this kind may occur, at least theoretically, in two ways. For example, as a consequence of a dispute
between members of a teamsters' union and an employer using
nonunion teamsters, union men on a construction job may refuse
to handle material hauled thereto by the nonunion teamsters. The
only way that any element of coercion directed at a third party
can be found in this situation is to assume either that the members of the construction crafts are coerced into refusing to handle
the materials, or that the conduct of these crafts is coercive of
those who seek to make use of the materials.
The matter of coercion of its own members by the union has,
perhaps strangely, been used more than once to support the issuance of an injunction to restrain a walk-out of the employees of a
neutral. Although frequently there may be realism in finding
that contented employees have been compelled by the rules of
their union to leave their jobs and thus to aid in a dispute in
which they have scant personal interest, if any, 0 nevertheless the
realities of such a situation should hardly be allowed to control.
Sometimes, also, individuals may be virtually forced to become
union men to avoid consequences that would be undesirable if not
unbearable, yet this is not a matter of direct concern to courts
considering, with regard to third persons, the operation of a union
rule on its members. A sufficient answer to coercion of union
members seems to lie in the fact that the organization of trade
unions has been given legal approval. And, as has been pointed
out in a well considered opinion, 1 if unions are permitted to organize, that such permission carries with it the power to adopt
rules for the control of the organization and its members necessarily follows. To say that the union should have an unabridged
privilege to adopt rules and enforce them without regard to the
circumstances which may justify their adoption would not be
wise.82 But if the members of a union are recognized as enjoying
30. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assn. of North
America, 274 U.S. 37, 47 S.Ct. 522, 71 L.Ed. 916 (1937); Lohse Patent Door Co. v.
Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S.W. 997, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 607, 128 Am. St. Rep. 492
(1908); Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N.J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881 (1894); Alfred
W. Booth & Bro. v. Burgess, 72 N.J. Eq. 181, 65 Atl. 226 (1906); Purvis v. Local
No. 500 U. B. of Carpenters and Joiners, 214 Pa. 348, 63 Atl. 585 (1906).
31. Bossert v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
77 Misc. 592, 137 N.Y. Supp. 321 (1912).
32. Barker Painting Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, 15 F. (2d) 16 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1926); Thomas v. Cincinatti,
N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 803 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1894); Bossert v. Dhuy, 221
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the privilege, acting in combination, to refrain from conduct that
will be a blow to the very organization itself, 8 the fact that in
a given case their actions result from the force of legitimate union
rules should not justify a finding of unlawful coercion by the
union representatives charged with their enforcement." The
justification for organization itself is at stake in such a case. The
suggestion that a third party may become so intimately associated
with the disputant employer as to justify measures which operate
coercively as to him is obviously applicable to the situation between a union and its members, if resort to any such theory is
necessary.
Concerning coercion of the user by the operation of such
rules, a sharp distinction must be made between conduct which is
primarily self-protective and that which is designed to coerce.
Obviously, if the members of one craft by handling or working
with or upon an article manufactured by, or destined for, an unfair employer make it possible for him to carry on his business
and successfully resist the demands of the union, they are thus
helping to break the backs of their fellows and to destroy unionism itself. If the law denies to them freedom of action and by the
use of legal process compels them to handle the product in question, it is thus doing for the disputant employer what it generally
N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582, Ann. Cas. 1918D 661 (1917); Falciglia v. Gallagher, 164
Misc. 838, 299 N.Y.S. 890 (Sup. Ct. 1937); O'Keefe v. Local 463 of United Ass'n
of Plumbers and Gasfitters of U. S. and Canada, 277 N.Y. 300, 14 N.E. (2d) 77
(1938).
33. Alfred W. Booth and Bro. v. Burgess, 72 N.J. Eq. 181, 65 Atl. 226
(1906).
34. "The decisions are practically in harmony in holding that it is within
the power of the labor unions, and it is lawful for them, to instruct or order
their members not to accept employment with an individual, or to continue
in such person's employment, where the action of a union is justifiable in the
sense that it is to promote the welfare of the members of the union." Seymour Ruff & Sons v. Bricklayers', Masons' and Plasterers' International
Union of America, 163 Md. 687, 164 Atl. 752, 757 (1933). See also, Paine Lbr.
Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 37 S.Ct. 718, 61 L.Ed. 1256 (1917); Bedford Cut Stone
Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n of North America, 274 U.S. 37, 47
S.Ct. 522, 71 L.Ed. 916 (1927); Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. 111 (D.C.
S.D.N.Y. 1914); Meier v. Speer, 96 Ark. 618, 132 S.W. 988, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 792
(1910); J. F. Parkinson v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027,
21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 550 (1908); Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers', Masons'
and Plasterers' Local Union No. 1, 92 Conn. 161, 101 Atl. 659 (1917); McCarter
v. Baltimore Chamber of Commerce, 126 Md. 131, 94 Atl. 541 (1915); Beck v.
Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N.W. 13 (1898); Gray
v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97 N.W. 663, 63 L.R.A. 753 (1903);
Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582, Ann. Cas. 1918D 661 (1917); W. F.
Const. Corp. v. Hanson, 250 App. Div. 727, 293 N.Y. Supp. 170 (1937); Rhodes
Bros. Co. v. Musicians' Union, 37 R.I. 281, 92 AtI. 641, L.R.A. 1915E 1037 (1915).
Compare Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294, 84 N.E. 457, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 162
(1908); Alfred W. Booth and Bro. v. Burgess, 72 N.J. Eq. 181, 65 Atl. 226 (1906).
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will not permit a union to do for itself, that is, to force another to
join in the fight against his will.
At the same time, self-protection is one thing, coercion of
third parties another. Perhaps there is more than a theoretical
difference between a refusal by union ,members to handle nonunion material, and a blanket notification to members of the
building trades that they will have "labor troubles" if they use
products of a certain manufacturer.8 5 According to one view, if
union men are privileged to refuse to handle nonunion materials, they should not be denied the privilege of notifying their
employers of such an intention. Indeed, this procedure is certainly fairer to everyone concerned. But to notify the one for
whom they are working as well as other interested parties that
"labor troubles" will follow under certain circumstances may well
mean more than the facts justify. Such notification has the color
of a direct attempt to control the conduct of these parties, with a
possible suggestion of the militant, rather than a mere thoughtful
endeavor to notify them of the policy of the union. In reality, the
effect generally may be the same in both cases, but sometimes an
actual difference is perceptible. Thus a refusal of union labor to
work on a union job for a subcontractor because the principal
contractor has another job where nonunion men are employed
seems primarily coercive. 8 In the same category fall cases where
there is a refusal to handle supplies sold by a manufacturer because he has furnished other supplies to one who has been declared unfair, 8 or where a union threatens to withdraw from a
job-not merely to refuse to handle nonunion material-if the
employer continues to purchase nonunion goods, "8 or the goods of
85. See however, Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582, Ann. Cas.
1918D 661 (1917), where the court said that the use of this expression simply
meant that if nonunion made materials are used the members of the Brotherhood will refuse to install the same.
36. Bricklayers', Masons' and Plasterers' International Union of America
v. Seymour Ruff & Sons, 160 Md. 483, 154 Atl. 52 (1931); cf. Seymour Ruff &
Sons Inc. v. Bricklayers', Masons' and Plasterers' International Union of
America, 163 Md. 687, 164 Ati. 752 (1933); see Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v.
Bricklayers', Masons' and Plasterers' Local Union No. 1, 92 Conn. 161, 101 Atl.
659 (1917); Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1067
(1906).
87. Temperton v. Russell [1893] 1 Q. B. 715.
38. Irving v. Joint District Council of New York and Vicinity of United
Brotherhood of Carpenters, 180 Fed. 896 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910); Anderson &
Lind Manufacturing Co. v. Carpenter's District Council, 308 Ill. 488, 139 N.E.
887 (1923) (unsatisfactory because end considered unlawful); Lohse Patent
Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S.W. 997, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 607, 128 Am. St.
Rep. 492 (1908); cf. Quinn v. Leathem [1901] A.C. 495; see also, Decorative
Stone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 18 F. (2d) 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1927) (under

1939]

SECONDARY

BOYCOTT

one who also sells to a nonunion employer.8 9 Although not always
clearly stated or perhaps recognized, the split in cases of this kind
must rest on the question whether the conduct of the union or
its members is reasonably necessary for the protection or advancement of union interests so that its coercive effect may be
treated as incidental, or whether these elements would be so remote without coercion that the latter must be considered the
primary desire and intention.40 With this in mind the tendency
should be in favor of recognizing a privilege in labor to refrain
from advancing the cause of those forces inimical to the best interests of the group and to promote the cause of unionism by refusing to handle or work with or upon materials manufactured by
nonunion labor, 41 by refusing to work for a subcontractor on a
the Sherman Act) aff'd 23 F. (2d) 426 (1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 594, 48 S.Ct.
530, 72 L.Ed. 1005 (1928).
39. Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351, 104 N.E. 841, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 778
(1914).
40. Cf. Bricklayers', Masons' and Plasterers' International Union of America v. Seymour Ruff & Sons, Inc., 160 Md. 483, 154 Atl. 52 (1931), with Seymour Ruff & Sons, Inc. v. Bricklayers', Masons' and Plasterers' International
Union of America, 163 Md. 687, 164 Atl. 752 (1933). See also, Bossert v. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 77 Misc. 592, 137 N.Y.
Supp. 321 (1912), where this distinction is very clearly stated.
41. Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97 N.W. 663, 63 L.R.A.
753, 103 Am. St. Rep. 477 (1903); George J. Grant Construction Co. v. St. Paul
Building Trades Council, 136 Minn. 167, 161 N.W. 520 (1917); Alfred W. Booth
& Bro. v. Burgess, 72 N.J. Eq. 181, 65 Atl. 226 (1906) (ground of decision
questionable); Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582, Ann. Cas. 1918D
661 (1917); State v. Van Pelt, 136 N.C. 633, 49 S.E. 177 (1904). Contra: Shine
v. Fox Bros. Mfg. Co., 156 Fed. 357 (C.C.A. 8th, 1907); Purvis v. Local No.
500, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 214 Pa. 348, 63 Atl. 585
(1906); Albro J. Newton Co. v. Erickson, 70 Misc. 291, 126 N.Y. Supp. 949
(1911); see Anderson & Lind Mfg. Co. v. Carpenters' District Council, 308 Ill.
488, 139 N.E. 887 (1923); cf. A. T. Stearns Lbr. Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157
N.E. 82 (1927); Armstrong Cork & Insulation Co. v. Walsh, 276 Mass. 263,
177 N.E. 2 (1931); Service Wood Heel Co. v. Mackesy, 199 N.E. 400 (Mass.
1936).
Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N.Y. 1, 124 N.E. 97 (1919), and Willson
& Adams Co. v. Pearce, 135 Misc. 426, 237 N.Y. Supp. 601 (1929), reversed, 265
N.Y. Supp. 624 (Sup. Ct. App. Div.'1933), aff'd without opinion, 264 N.Y. 521,
191 N.E. 545 (1934), should be compared with the Bossert case. In the latter
the court was very specific in pointing out that there Was involved no more
than a refusal of members of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners to install or handle nonunion made materials in order to protect their
position as workingmen. In the Auburn case it was found that members of
the Central Labor Union threatened to strike and did strike against the
customers of the plaintiff, and threatened to withdraw and did withdraw
patronage from them because of their business dealings with the plaintiff,
in short, that they purposed to bring loss and injury to such customers
unless the latter discontinued all dealings with the plaintiff. Such findings
definitely show that the court was objecting to that practice generally known
as the "secondary boycott," i.e., intentional coercion of disinterested third
persons, a practice vastly different from refusing to aid the enemy by handling his products, which the Bossert case involved. Furthermore, the court
in the Auburn case indicated very definitely that it considered the end un-
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job where the principal contractor is nonunion,4 2 by refusing to
work on the same job with nonunion men,43 or by refusing to handle work for customers of their employers who are in dispute with
union labor. 44 The tendency to scrutinize carefully the relationship between the various crafts that may combine in action of
this sort springs from a feeling that there are reasonable limits
to the necessity for such a program, and that when these limits
are passed the coercive design becomes plainly visible. Furtherlawful. The case might be compared with Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492,
57 N.E. 1011, 51 L.R.A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330 (1900), in this respect. The
Willson & Adams case, however, is by no means as easy to explain. There
were a number of plaintiffs, all using nonunion teamsters. The defendants
included the Building Trades Council consisting of all trades. It was found
that members of the building trades council were frequently called from jobs
because nonunion teamsters were used in the hauling of materials to the
Jobs although such members were not called upon to handle such materials,
and that they were called off one job simply because materials were hauled
to other jobs of the same contractor by nonunion teamsters. Apparently in
all cases the materials were union made. The lower court took the view that
the end, which it found to be to compel the nonunion teamsters in the employ
of the plaintiffs to join the union, was unlawful. The Appellate Division reversed, saying very briefly, that the end and means were lawful. It disposed
of the Wardell case in a sentence, suggesting that the union conduct there
was "inconsistent with the public interests, or hurtful to the public order,
or detrimental to the public good," an amazing way to handle a question of
such moment to employers and employees alike. Very difficult is it to believe
that self-protection required the kind of conduct as that found by the court.
Intentional coercion of third parties was manifest. The only reasonable distinction between this case and the Wardell case Is that the former involved
merely a refusal of union men to work on a job where materials hauled by
nonunion teamsters were used, and a refusal to work for a contractor who on
any job, whether the one where the strike occurred or not, undertook to use
materials delivered by nonunion teamsters, that such conduct was required
in order to protect their positions as workingmen, and that any resulting coercion was incidental. Such a position would seem tenuous indeed. It Is particularly unfortunate that the Court of Appeals did not take the opportunity
to express itself more definitely on the problem.
42. Meier v. Speer, 96 Ark. 618, 132 S. W. 988, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 792 (1910);
Seymour Ruff & Sons v. Bricklayers', Masons' and Plasterers' International
Union of America, 163 Md. 687, 164 Atl. 752 (1933); but see, Bricklayers', Masons' and Plasterers' International Union of America v. Seymour, Ruff &
Sons, 160 Md. 483, 154 Atl. 52 (1931).
43. Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97 N.W. 663, 63 L.R.A.
753, 103 Am. St. Rep. 477 (1903); Meier v. Speer, 96 Ark. 618, 132 S.W. 988, 32
L.R.A. (N.S.) 792 (1910); National Protective Association of Steam Fitters and
Helpers v. Cummins, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369, 58 L.R.A. 135, 88 Am. St. Rep.
648 (1902); Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 35 F. (2d) 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), reversed, 40 F.
(2d) 189 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1930). But see Blandford v. Duthie, 128 Atl. 138 (Ct. App.
Md. 1925) (probably overruled by Seymour Ruff & Sons v. Bricklayers', Masons' and Plasterers' International Union of America, 163 Md. 687, 164 Atl. 752
(1933)); cf. New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198, 105 N.E.
885 (1914).
44. Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. 111 (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1914); Iron
Moulders Union No. 125 v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 315
(C.C.A. 7th, 1908); cf. Carlson v. Carpenter Contractors' Assn., 305 Ill. 331, 137
N.E. 222, 27 A.L.R. 625 (1922).
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more, where widespread activity occurs the public interest is felt
more keenly. 5
The courts sometimes lay emphasis on the existence of a
threat to withhold services or to strike against materials. This
judicial practice has provoked criticism on the theory that what
an individual is legally privileged to do he is likewise legally
privileged to threaten to do.4 1 But this matter is not quite as sim-

ple as it sounds. To approach a business man with the announced
intention of striking against him because of his dealings with
another smacks strongly of an effort to compel him tc do one's
bidding-action of a darker shade than merely supporting the
organization by refusing to be of assistance to the enemy. On the
one hand, there is action directed at accomplishing a specific object; on the other, there is no stated direction. There is a suggestion in the first case that the primary effort and intention are
to compel assistance in one's fight with another, conduct that
amounts to more than merely refraining from doing that which
may be detrimental to one's own interests. The difference here
is between the punitive and the defensive, between negative or
affirmative coercion of neutrals.'7 If conduct of this kind is mere45. See Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N.Y. 1, 124 N.E. 97, 6 A.L.R.
901 (1919); Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 27 F. (2d) 560 (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1928), 35 F.
(2d) 34 (1929), reversed on authority of Sherman Act, 40 F. (2d) 189 (C.C.A.
2d, 1930). In the Aeolian case the District Judge said: "How far the members
of a craft may go in their organized capacity in refusing to work in the same
building with nonunion members of other crafts is a question not so simple of
solution. It depends upon the extent to which those who co-operate have in
point of fact a common interest, and are justified in what they do by honest
motives to advance self-interest, as opposed to malicious intent to injure the
business or good will of another." 27 F. (2d) at 564.
46. See the arguments against the practice in Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes (1937) 47 Yale L.J. 341, 358. Compare the dissenting
opinion of Justice Holmes in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077,
1079 (1896). See also, Iron Moulders Union No. 125 v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166
Fed. 45, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 315 (C.C.A. 7th, 1908); Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v.
Bricklayers', Masons' and Plasterers' Local Union No. 1, 92 Conn. 161, 101 Atl.
659, 6 A.L.R. 887 (1917); Empire Theatre v. Cloke, 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107,
L.R.A. 1917E 383 (1917); Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co. v. Montana Fed. of
Labor, 156 Fed. 809 (C.C. Mont. 1907); Irving v. Joint District Council of New
York and Vicinity of United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 180 Fed. 896 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1910); Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389, 83 N.E. 928, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 85, 22 Am.
St. Rep. 119, 13 Ann. Cas. 82 (1908); Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351, 104 N.E.
841, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 778 (1914); New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern,
218 Mass. 198, 105 N.E. 885 (1914); Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo.
421, 114 S.W. 997, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 607, 128 Am. St. Rep. 492 (1908).
47. "Whether such a notification would in any case amount to a threat or
intimidation must be determined from all the facts and circumstances of each
particular case. Such notice might have special significance in a particular
case, and have no meaning in another." Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91
Minn. 171, 97 N.W. 663, 668, 63 L.R.A. 753, 103 Am. St. Rep. 447 (1903). See also,
Thomas v. Cinn. N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 803 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1894).
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ly protective support of the organization, the fact that it may interfere with the neutral's exercise of a free will is inconsequential
because incidental. But the case is different when the incident
becomes the primary and undisguised endeavor.
If we grant that only notification of an intention to do an unlawful act can properly be considered as a threat within the law,
our problem is not necessarily solved. As has previously been
shown, where there is lacking a sufficient interest to serve as legal
justification, it is generally considered unlawful for a combination
to engage in a general suspension of business contacts for the purpose of coercing'an individual-to accept the dictates of the group.
And the difference between warning before acting and acting
without warning may characterize conduct as punitive or intimidating where otherwise it would go as protective. Those courts
that repeat the formula that what one is privileged to do one may
threaten, are usually confronted with situations where labor's efforts to bring its policies to the attention of those who might be
affected by them do not appear to spring from a punitory design. 8
Sometimes it is very difficult to determine whether labor is merely
following a policy designed as defensive, or is seeking to compel a neutral to act in its favor. This difficulty, however, is perhaps not too great to require condonation of the program in every
case. In solving this problem a showing that the plan is a part of
settled and general union policy as contradistinguished from a determination to cover the specific case, should be given weight.
But, of course, coercion of neutrals may be a part of such policy,
and who can say whether a particular union rule was adopted as a
necessary defensive measure apart from the desire to force neutrals to sever their contacts with the employer? 49 The only safe
guide must be the demonstrated necessities of each case. Therefore, in the last analysis the problem for the courts is to determine
just how far it is necessary for labor to implicate neutrals in its
struggle in order adequately to advance or protect its legitimate
interests. 0 If there should come a settled feeling that action
48. The distinction suggested here will clearly appear by a comparison of
the prevailing opinion with the dissenting opinion of Shaw, J., in J. F. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council of Santa Clara County, 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac.
1027 (1908). See also, State v. Van Pelt, 136 N.C. 633, 49 S.E. 177, 68 L.R.A.
760 (1904).
49. See the concurring opinion of Sloss, J. in J. F. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council of Santa Clara County, 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. at 1037 (1908).
50. See Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 35 F. (2d) 34 (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1929), reversed
on authority of Sherman Act, 40 F. (2d) 189 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1930). The sociological aspects are considered in Notes: (1917) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 482; (1920) 34
Harv. L. Rev. 880; (1920) 30 Yale L. J. 280.
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against a neutral is necessary to the adequate protection of these
interests, the coercive aspect of such conduct would be entitled to
no weight, just as the coercive aspect of a strike against an employer is now considered immaterial in the light of a broader
vision concerning labor's privilege to engage in economic conflict
with employers. 51
51. A reasonable distinction between the doctrines of Plant v. Wood, 176
Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011, 51 L.R.A. 339, 49 Am. St. Rep. 330 (1900), and Pickett v.
Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1067, 116 Am. St. Rep. 272,
7 Ann. Cas. 638 (1906), can be seen by viewing these cases from the standpoint
of the secondary boycott. In both the plaintiff's were employees, not employers, and the defendants were union men. In both the claim was that the defendants were acting unlawfully with respect to the plaintiffs in undertaking
to secure their discharge because they were nonunion men. In the first case
the court found that the sole effort on the part of the defendants was to force
the plaintiffs to become members of the union and that they had threatened
to strike against the employer in order to compel him to force the plaintiffs to
join the union by threatening in turn to discharge them if they refused. This
was found unlawful. In the second case the court found that the defendants
were trying to get all of the employer's work for themselves, which purpose
was lawful notwithstanding that the discharge of the plaintiff's nonunion
men might result. Unfortunately, the result of Plant v. Woods has been the
adoption by the Massachusetts courts of the view that a strike to secure a
closed shop is illegal. This view was not required by the decision in that case
because striking to secure a closed shop may very likely mean striking to
secure all of the work in the shop for union men, rather than striking to
compel outsiders to join the union, and the fact that membership in the union
would be open to nonunion men should not militate against such a result.
Shinsky v. O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99, 121 N.E. 790 (1919). In fact, in the Plant case
the plaintiffs were the victims of that practice usually called a secondary boycott. The real end was to compel the plaintiffs to join the union. With respect
to this end the employer was a third party yet the defendants were threatening to damage him by a strike in order to compel him to act against the
plaintiffs. In the Pickett case the end was getting all the work for union men,
something the employer could give them, and the union men were trying to
force him to do so by means of a strike. If nonunion men were injured in this
effort such injury was incidental, not intentional.
Later Massachusetts cases involving more directly the problem considered
in this paper do not demonstrate a close analysis of the question. While Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351, 104 N.E. 841, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 778 (1914) and New
England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198, 105 N.E. 885 (1914) seem
sound, A. T. Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N.E. 82, 52 A.L.R.
1125 (1927), Armstrong Cork & Insulation Co. v. Walsh, 276 Mass. 263, 177 N.E.
2 (1931) and Service Wood Heel Co. v. Mackesy, 199 N.E., 400 (Mass. 1936) are
questionable.
The problem in Plant v. Woods was recently before the Supreme Court of
the United States in Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 58 S.Ct. 578 (1938). In an
effort to compel the employer to force his employees against their wishes to
join the defendant union, on pain of their discharge, picketing the employer's
meat markets was resorted to. None of the employees were members of the
union and none were on strike. Contrary to the District Court and the Circuit
Court of Appeals (82 F. (2d) 68 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936), 90 F. (2d) 250 (C.C.A. 7th,
1937)), the Court found the existence of a "labor dispute" within the NorrisLaGuardia Act (Act of March 23, 1932, c. 90, 47 Stat. 70, [U.S.C. tit. 29 § 101
et seq.,] 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq.) and the Wisconsin Act (Wise. Stat. 1937,
§ 103.62) modelled on the Federal Act. There was a vigorous dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Butler in which Mr. Justice McReynolds concurred. Although the Court said that the case being considered was indistinguishable
from the earlier case of Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5,
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THE EFFECT OF THE ANTI-TRUST ACTS

Primarily, to turn from a consideration of the common law
aspects of combined action by labor against an employer, to the
legality of such action under the Anti-Trust Acts, 52 is to turn from

a balancing of competing interests with economic superiority on
one side and the weight of concerted action on the other, to a determination of whether the conduct being considered is contrary
to the applicable statute. However, this examination also should
involve a balancing of interests," yet because attention is centered on the encouragement of unrestricted trading and the unwholesomeness of combinations which tend to restrain trade, the
relative strength of the opposing factions may not be given its due
weight.
The Supreme Court has made fairly clear how cases arising
under the Sherman Act and involving coercion of third parties
are to be handled. Foremost among its decisions is the Danbury
Hatters case.54 The facts of the conflict there under scrutiny of
the Court leave little to debate concerning the presence of injury
to free trade.5 5 Indeed, they show that the program followed by
301 U.S. 468, 57 S.Ct. 857, 81 L.Ed. 1229 (1937), the issue there was whether or
not peaceful picketing was permissible under the Wisconsin Act where the
object was to compel the plaintiff, against his wishes, because of a limiting
rule of the union and against his personal interest, to operate his shop as a
union shop. That is, the primary purpose of the picketing was not to compel
Senn to compel his employees to join the union-thus attempting to destroy
the liberty of the employees through coercion of a third person-but to compel
Senn to employ union labor. In Schuster v. International Association of Machinists, Auto Mechanics Lodge No. 701, 293 Ill. App. 177, 12 N.E. (2d) 50
(1938), a similar practice was approved, while in Blanchard v. Golden Age
Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P. (2d) 397 (1936) a contrary view was taken.
See also, Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks' Union, Local No. 148, 184 Wash. 322,
51 P. (2d) 372 (1935), and cf. Union Premier Food Stores, Inc. v. Retail Food
C. & M. Union, Local No. 1357, 98 F. (2d) 821 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1938), and John F.
Trommer, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Brewery Workers of Greater New York, 167
Misc. 197, 3 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 782 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
52. Only the cases arising under the Sherman Act (Act of July 2, 1890, 26
Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1929), and the Clayton Act (Act of October
15, 1914, 38 Stat. 738 (1890), 29 U.S.C.A. § 52 (1927)) will be here examined. It is
not necessary to consider whether the Sherman Act was designed to apply to
labor unions or their conduct. That question has been very completely discussed elsewhere. See Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (1930) 3-54; Witte,
The Government in Labor Disputes (1932) 61-74; Frankfurter and Greene, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 8, 139n; Landis, Book Review (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 875.
53. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assn., 274 U.S. 37, 56, 47 S.Ct. 522, 71
L.Ed. 916, 54 L.R.A. 791 (1927).
54. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 28 S.Ct. 301, 52 L.Ed. 488, 13 Ann. Cas.
815 (1908); and Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522, 35 S.Ct. 170, 59 L.Ed. 341 (1915).
55. Wholesalers and retailers in many parts of the country were waited
upon by representatives of the union who let them know that further dealings with the manufacturer or his product would result in the power of the
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labor did not merely amount to a combined refusal by union men
generally to purchase the product of the manufacturer but also
involved a determined attempt to compel the manufacturer's vendees, wholesalers and retailers, to act detrimentally to the interests of the employer by threatening them with like injury to their
businesses if they did not oblige. In brief, economic pressure on
the wholesalers and retailers throughout the country was not a
mere necessary incident of labor's attempt to abstain from promoting the interests of the manufacturer by buying its hats, but,
on the contrary, was the specific endeavor as manifested by the
efforts to destroy the general patronage of such concerns.56 This
is the program that the court found inherent in the publication
and dissemination of the "Unfair" and "We Don't Patronize" lists
as shown by the specific acts against middlemen committed by
the union representatives.
In the famous Duplex case 57 the Court made very specific its
opinion that under the Sherman Act the question at issue did not
concern the legality or illegality of the end or the means but was
union being focused upon them, and in some instances their names were
added to the "unfair" lists.
56. Nowhere has the distinction here considered received clearer statement than in the concurring opinion of Van Orsdel, J., in the similar case of
American Federation of Labor v. Buck's Stove and Range Co., 33 App. D. C.
83, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 748 (1909), appeal dismissed as moot, 219 U.S. 581, 31 S.
Ct. 472, 55 L.Ed. 345 (1910): "The word 'boycott' is here used as referring to
what is usually understood as the 'secondary boycott'; and when used in this
opinion, it is intended to be applied exclusively in that sense.... From this
clear distinction it will be observed that there is no boycott until the members of the organization have passed the point of refusing to patronize the
person or corporation themselves, and have entered the field where, by coercion or threats, they prevent others from dealing with such persons or corSo long, then, as the American Federation of Labor, and those
poration ....
acting under its advice, refused to patronize complainant, the combination
had not arisen to the dignity of an unlawful conspiracy or a boycott.... The
unlawful conspiracy here consists in the membership of the American Federation of Labor banding together, not to cease dealing with the complainant
or purchasing or using its products, but by threats to coerce others not to
patronize the complainant, on penalty of the destruction of their business."
32 L.R.A. (N.S.) at 765-766. The language of Robb, J., who wrote the principal
opinion in which Van Orsdel, J., concurred shows what Van Orsdel, J., meant
by referring to "threats to coerce": "That no physical coercion was practiced
in this case does not alter our conclusion, since restraint of the mind, as the
evidence in this case clearly demonstrates, is just as potent as a threat of
physical violence." 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) at 761. See also, Gompers v. Buck's Stove
and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 437, 31 S.Ct. 492, 496, 55 L.Ed. 797, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.)
874 (1911) (a contempt proceeding under the injunction issued by the lower
court); Loewe v. California State Federation of Labor, 139 Fed. 71 (N. D. Cal.
1905); Sailors' Union of the Pacific v. Hammon Lumber Co., 156 Fed. 450
(C.C.A. 9th, 1907).
57. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S.Ct. 172, 65
L.Ed. 349, 16 A.L.R. 196 (1921), noted in (1921) 21 Col. L. Rev. 258; (1921) 19
Mich. L. Rev. 628; (1921) 7 Va. L. Rev. 462.
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solely whether or not the conduct of the union was intended to
restrain and did restrain commerce among the states.58 This position, of course, effectively ruled out of consideration the question
that would have been of primary importance under an application
of common law principles, namely, whether the program in the
light of the common interest between the members of the affiliated unions involved in the contest could be properly viewed as
self-defensive rather than coercive. The majority opinion, without a detailed statement of the particular acts complained of, that
is, without addressing. itself to the problem of whether the conduct involved more than a refusal to handle the complainant's
product, ruled that the purpose of the union was to coerce customers of the complainant into withholding their patronage. This
was properly characterized, if the finding be accepted, as a secondary boycott, which, in turn, was found to be beyond the protection of the Clayton amendment.50 Indeed, in the light of the view
entertained by the majority concerning the applicability and
scope of the act, the distinction between incidental and intentional coercion of third parties would be unimportant. The dissenters, however, felt that such a distinction was important and
undertook to show the community of interest in the dispute with
the manufacturer between the trades involved, and that the program amounted to no more than a refusal of the members of such
trades to lend their services to the support of the manufacturer's
cause and to the destruction of the cause of union labor.00
Although in the Duplex case the union program was based on
the sympathetic assistance of different crafts, and therefore might
with some reason have been viewed more as an effort to compel
58. See also, United Leather Workers International Union v, Herkert &
Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 44 S.Ct. 623, 68 L.Ed. 1104, 33 A.L.R. 566 (1924);
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 268 U.S. 295, 45 S.Ct. 551,
69 L.Ed. 963 (1925); Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. U.S., 268 U.S. 64, 45
S.Ct. 403, 69 L.Ed. 849 (1925); cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones
and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937); National
Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 S.Ct. 642, 81
L.Ed. 918 (1937); National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 57 S.Ct. 645, 81 L.Ed. 921 (1937); Santa Cruz Fruit
Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 58 S.Ct. 656 (1938); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 90 F. (2d) 155 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1937).
59. See note 52, supra.
60. The dissenting opinion was written by Mr. Justice Brandeis, and was
concurred in by Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Clarke. This opinion
should be very carefully compared with the same Justice's dissenting opinion
in Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutter's Assn., 274 U.S. 37, 63, 47
S.Ct. 522, 71 L.Ed. 916, 54 L.R.A. 791 (1927), where he said, in referring to the
union conduct in the Duplex case, "It was the institution of a general boycott,
not only of the business of the employer, but of the businesses of all who
should participate in the marketing, installing or exhibition of its product."
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the cooperation of neutrals, only one craft was involved in the
case of Bedford Cut Stone Company v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association6 ' which followed six years later. There the Court
reiterated its opinion that the sole question was whether the conduct of the union constituted an interference with interstate commerce under the act, and found that the countrywide refusal of
the Association's members to work with or on the plaintiff's stone
-in keeping with a provision of the constitution of the Association-was a violation of the Sherman Act.6 2 The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis was based on the view that the rule
of the Association's constitution and the cooperation between
members required thereby, constituted a policy necessary to the
protection of the interests of the craft and to avoid self-destruction. This was followed by the position that if from action of this
character a restraint of interstate commerce resulted, such restraint could not be classed as "unreasonable" under the settled
jurisprudence of the Court.
Whatever may be said of the Duplex case concerning the
existence of a purpose on the part of the union to directly coerce
third parties into discontinuing or withholding their patronage,
that such a finding would not have been justified by the facts of
the Bedford case seems clear. This means, of course, that the latter
case did not involve the so-called secondary boycott, and therefore demonstrates that, in fact as well as in statement, the Supreme Court does not consider that the finding of an attempt by
labor to compel the assistance of neutrals is necessary to a proper
application of the Sherman Act."
THE EFFECT OF THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACTS

The Norris-LaGuardia Act" was largely the result of the concern felt by labor over the treatment received by the Clayton Act
61. 274 U.S. 37, 47 S.Ct. 522, 71 L.Ed. 916, 54 L.R.A. 791 (1927), noted in
(1927) 40 HIarv. L. Rev. 1154; (1927) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 198; (1927) 14 Va. L. Rev.
112; (1927) 37 Yale L. J. 84.
62. See also, Buyer v. Guillan, 271 Fed. 65 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1921); Irving v.
Neal, 209 Fed. 471 (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1913); Decorative Stone Co. v. Building
Trades Council of Westchester County, 18 F. (2d) 333 (S.D. N.Y. 1927); 23 F.
(2d) 426 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1928); Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 40 F. (2d) 189 (C.C.A. 2nd,

1930); Paine Lbr. Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 37 S.Ct. 718, 61 L.Ed. 1256 (1917);
A. T. Stearns Lbr. Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N.E. 82, 52 A.L.R. 1125
(1927).
63. For a collection of cases dealing with similar State Acts, see Note
(1923) 27 A.L.R. 656.
64. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-115 (1934).
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at the hands of the Supreme Court in the Duplex case.6 5 Although
this act deals with more than the problem presented in the Duplex

case, the following discussion will be directed solely at its effect
on practices designed to coerce third parties into action detrimental to the party with whom a labor dispute exists.6 This statute and similar statutes enacted by a number of the states, with
the exception of the Wisconsin Act which confers legality on the
conduct covered therein, prohibit only the issuance of injunctions
in labor disputes.6 7 The result is that, except in Wisconsin, conduct on the part of a labor union or its members which was of
such a nature as to permit recovery of damages, prior to enactment of such legislation, is unchanged in this respect. The legislation merely withholds injunctive relief.
From the standpoint of coercion of third parties, the important provisions found in almost the same language in all the acts,
prohibit the issuance of any restraining order or injunction "...
in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute... from ... whether singly or in concert... Ceasing or
refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
65. For a discussion of the legislative efforts in this connection and an
analysis of the provisions of the legislation which was finally adopted as the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, see Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra note 2,
205-226. See also, Witte, the Government in Labor Disputes (1932).
66. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was held constitutional in Lauf v. E. G.
Shinner & Co., 58 S.Ct. 578 (1938). Previously the court had approved the
constitutionality of the similar Wisconsin Act in Senn v. Tile Layers' Protective Association, Local No. 5, 301 U.S. 468, 57 S.Ct. 857, 81 L.Ed. 1229 (1937).
For general discussion of such legislation, see Feinberg, Analysis of the New
York Law of Secondary Boycott (1937) 6 Brooklyn L. Rev. 209, 217; Fraenkel,
Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and Yellow Dog Contracts (1936)
30 Ill. L. Rev. 854; Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act (1932) 16 Minn.
L. Rev. 638; Hellerstein, supra note 46, at 359; Notes (1936) 5 Fordham L. Rev.
125; (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1295; (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1257; (1934) 12 N.Y.
U. L. Q. Rev. 101; (1935) 4 Int. Jur. Ass'n Bull. 1; (1936) 5 Id. at 5, 59; (1937)
5 id. at 113; (1937) 6 id. at 1; (1938) 6 id. at 111.
67. Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 97, § 78; Idaho Laws 1933, p. 215;
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 501-514; La. Act 203 of 1934; Md. Laws
(1935) c. 574; Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1936) §§ 4260-4267; N.Y. Civil Prac.
Act § 876-a; N.D. Laws 1935, c. 247; Ore. Code Ann. (Supp. 1935) §§ 49-19041906; Pa. Laws 1937, No. 308; Utah Laws 1933, c. 15; Wash. Laws 1937 Spec.
Sess., c. 7, § 4; Wis. Stat. (1935) §§ 103.51 et seq.; Wyo. Laws 1933, c. 37, § 3, as
amended by Wyo. Laws 1937, c. 15. The following statutes are very limited in
their application: Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4286; Ill. Laws
1925 p. 378; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1935) HI 60-1107; N. J. Laws 1926,
c. 207. The Oregon Act was held constitutional in Starr v. Laundry and Dry
Cleaning Workers Local Union No. 101, 155 Ore. 634, 63 P. (2d) 1104 (1936),
as was the Louisiana Act in Dehan v. Hotel & Rest. Employees and Beverage
Dispensers Local U. No. 183, 159 So. 637 (La. App. 1935); the Washington Act
was held unconstitutional in Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash.
396, 63 P. (2d) 397 (1936).
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employment.... Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts
involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking,
patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or violence.... [or] Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing
68
without fraud or violence" such acts.
At first sight, if the act protects striking and picketing or advertising in any manner free from fraud or violence, then striking against or picketing a neutral would seem to be protected.
However, this kind of conduct is protected only when the case involves or grows out of a labor dispute, and, in accordance with the
definition given in the act, such a case is presented if it "involves
persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein; or who are
employees of the same employer; or who are members of the
same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees...
or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests
in a 'labor dispute' . . . of 'persons participating or interested'
therein ... "
The question is, does this definition include picketing or striking against a neutral to compel him to act against the disputant
employer? Although it is not very aptly drawn, the sense must
be that a case shall be held to involve or grow out of a labor dispute when it results from an existing labor dispute, that is, "any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee," and "involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation," and so forth. The word "case"
must refer to the case presented to the court, and "same industry,
trade, craft, or occupation" to the industry in which the labor dispute occurs, in keeping with the definition of a person "participating or interested in a labor dispute" as one against whom relief is sought and who "is engaged in the same industry, trade,
68. The provisions herein quoted (italics supplied) are from the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-115 (1934). Some of the
acts (e.g., the Louisiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Utah statutes cited in
note 67, supra) but not others (notably the federal act) free from injunctive
control "Ceasing to patronize any person or persons" whether singly or in
concert and urging others to do the same. The significance of this language
will be considered later. The Wisconsin act contains such language but further provides that "nothing herein shall be construed to legalize a secondary
boycott." Wis. Stat. (1935) § 103.53.
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craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs," and so forth,
common industry of the plaintiff and deinstead of to the possible
69
fendant in the case.
There are perhaps two angles to the question raised inasmuch
as the complainant seeking injunctive relief may be the neutral
instead of the employer in dispute with union labor. In undertaking to determine whether the act would be applicable to a case
where the disputant employer is seeking an injunction to prevent
the focusing of coercion on a neutral, the possibilities for construction or interpretation are reasonably narrow. In such event
the definition requires only that a labor dispute exist and that the
defendants be engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which the dispute occurs, or have direct or indirect
interests therein, or be members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees, or otherwise come within the
definition, and that such defendants be engaged in any of the conduct covered by section 4. Clearly, then, if the employees of a
third person quit work, or threaten to quit work, or are induced
to quit work as a consequence of their union membership and in
keeping with instructions received, because such person is having
business relations with an employer who is engaged in a labor dispute, no injunction may issue as long as their organization is at
least affiliated with the organization engaged in the dispute. Perhaps the only real change this may make over sound common law
is that such action is not limited to that which is self-protective
since the language of the act is broad enough to cover conduct
which is primarily directed at coercion of a third party. Likewise,
if union men belonging to the organization in dispute, or to an
69. Cf. however, Note (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 746, 747, dealing with Diamond Full Fashioned Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 20 F. Supp. 467 (D. C. E. D. Pa.
1937) wherein it is said: "There was probably no labor dispute between the
plaintiff and the defendant in the instant case, since the 'controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment' was between the defendant union
and the Vogue Company. However, it would seem clear, in view of the fact
that the plaintiff corporation and the members of the defendant union were
both engaged in manufacturing hosiery, that, in the words of § 13 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, the case involved 'persons engaged in the same industry, trade, craft or occupation; or have direct or indirect interest therein';
and hence that the case grew out of a labor dispute within the meaning of
the statute."
If the action is brought by the employer having the dispute the meaning
is clear enough but conceivably, of course, when the court is presented with
an action by a third party to enjoin labor practices affecting his business,
he and the defendants before the court might be engaged in the same industry although such industry might not be the one in which the "labor
dispute" occurs. It is not believed that the interpretation employed in the
above mentioned case note was intended. See infra, pp. 306.
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affiliated organization, engage in a program of advertising, speaking, or patrolling in connection with the neutral establishment,
the disputant employer may not prevent this by injunction, subject perhaps to one qualification: that such conduct must cover
"giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in" a
labor dispute. Therefore, if union men picket the place of business of a retailer for the purpose of announcing to the public
that the retailer is selling a nonunion product, the question is, does
this amount to giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts
involved in a labor dispute?
That such conduct at least goes beyond giving publicity to
the existence of a labor dispute seems reasonably clear. As to
whether it constitutes giving publicity to the facts involved in a
labor dispute, it may be recalled that a "labor dispute" under the
act is some controversy over terms or conditions of employment
or union efforts to secure the right to arrange terms or conditions
of employment.70 Therefore, "the facts involved in any labor dispute" may well be only that a particular manufacturer is considered as unfair because he will not employ union labor or accede
to union demands concerning terms or conditions of employment
or the privilege of arranging the latter. Although announcing
that a particular product is nonunion, or unfair, would likely be
within the statutory language, if the pickets should undertake
to announce the retailer as unfair a more doubtful case is presented. Such conduct could not readily be considered as constituting giving publicity to the existence of a labor dispute, or to
the facts involved in a labor dispute. Therefore, although the language referred to seems broad enough to cover picketing a product at the point of distribution to the public as against any demand of the manufacturer for injunctive relief, it apparently is
70. See Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 58 S.Ct. 578 (1938), which will clear
up the confusion resulting from conflicting holdings of lower federal courts
concerning what constitutes a labor dispute. A collection of decisions by
lower federal courts will be found in Hellerstein, supra note 46, at 364. In
accord with the holding of the Supreme Court are: American Furniture Co.
v. I. B. of T. C.' and H. of A. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, 222 Wis. 338,
268 N.W. 250 (1936); Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n of Mechanics,
155 Ore. 652, 63 P. (2d) 1090 (1936); Schuster v. Int'l Association of Machinists, etc., 293 Ill. App. 177, 12 N.E. (2d) 50 (1938). See also Lletzman v. Radio
Broadcasting Station WCFL, 282 Ill. App. 203 (1935). But see Feller v. Local
144, I. L. G. W. U., 121 N.J. Eq. 452, 191 Atl. 111 (1937); International Ticket
Co. v. Wendrich, 123 N.J. Eq. 172, 196 Atl. 474 (1938); Thompson v. Boekhaut,
273 N.Y. 390, 7 N.E. (2d) 674 (1937) (no labor dispute where employer did
his own work). Cf. Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396,
63 P. (2d) 397 (1936).
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not broad enough to cover an attempt, by picketing or otherwise,
to interfere with the general patronage of a retailer.
The next inquiry is, should the problems just considered be
resolved in the same way if the suit is brought by the third party
suffering from the union program? The primary issue here concerns the meaning of the expression "involve persons." As has
been seen, the act prohibits the issuance of an injunction in any
case "involving or growing out of a labor dispute" and such a case
is one which "involves persons who are engaged in the same industry," and so forth. In determining whether the "case" which
is presented to the court when a neutral seeks an injunction is
covered by the act is it necessary to find that both the plaintiff
and the defendants are engaged in the same industry, for example, in which the dispute occurs? Or may the case "involve persons" within the meaning of the act if it involves defendants who
would fall within any of the mentioned categories without regard to the plaintiff, or vice versa? The wording of the act does
not throw any great light on the matter, but if the act was prepared with a view to covering cases where the plaintiff is a third
party aggrieved by union conduct and if the expression "same industry

. .

." refers in such connection to the common industry of

plaintiff and defendants, then whenever a third person's employees act against him their conduct would be protected without regard to the possible fact that the industry in which he may
be engaged is not the industry in which the dispute occurs. This
reasoning would lead one to believe that when this section was
drawn the drafters were thinking about actions brought by the
about the possibility of acemployer having the dispute and not
71
tion by an aggrieved third person.
Aside from the language of the act and the possibilities of
construction, there remains the question of the legislative intent
in general. Using the background of this kind of legislation as a
guide, there may arise a serious question concerning the presence
of any intent to remove from the protection of injunctive relief
the practice of focusing compulsion on a neutral in order to force
him to aid the union in its struggle. The chief reasons for the
adoption of the Norris-LaGuardia act are to be found in the
71. See note 69, supra. Of course this language may mean that the act
is applicable to suit by a neutral if the neutral and the defendants are engaged in the same industry, etc., as that in which the dispute occurs.
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opinions of the Supreme Court in the Tri-City 2 and Duplex7

cases decided under the Clayton amendment to the Sherman Act.
In the Duplex case the Clayton act was held to be inapplicable
because the defendants included others than employees of the
complainant manufacturer, notwithstanding the claim that the
Clayton Act was designed to make possible a greater degree of
cooperation between union organizations without regard to the
absence of an employer-employee relationship. Also, the position
of the union, as reflected in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis, was that it was merely refraining from conduct that
would be of material assistance to the manufacturer, and that any
effect of such conduct on actual or prospective customers of the
complainant was merely an incidental and perhaps unavoidable
result of the union's efforts to protect and advance its own interests by using its combined strength against the offender. Further,
as shown by the court in the Duplex case, the evidence is clear
that the Clayton Act was not designed to protect the secondary
boycott. 74 Finally, the arguments in the House in favor of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act by its author in that body show his position
that his act was only a rewriting of the principles of the Clayton
Act in terms broad enough to foreclose the employer-employee
limitation imposed by the court in the Duplex case.7 5 It is not at
72. American Steel Foundries Co. v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257
U.S. 184, 42 S.Ct. 72, 66 L.Ed. 189, 27 A.L.R. 360 (1921).
73. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S.Ct. 172, 65
L.Ed. 349, 16 A.L.R. 196 (1921). The case of Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 47 S.Ct. 522, 71 L.Ed. 916, 54 A.L.R. 791
(1927), undoubtedly added much fuel to the fire.
74. Of particular significance is the following language of the spokesman
for the Judiciary Committee of the House appearing in 51 Cong. Rec. 9652,
9658 (1914): Mr. Webb: "I will say frankly-when this section was drawn it
was drawn with the careful purpose not to legalize the secondary boycott,
and we do not think it does .... It does legalize the primary boycott; it
does legalize the strike; it does legalize persuading others to strike, to quit
but we did not intend, I will say
work, and the ,other acts mentioned ....
frankly, to legalize the secondary boycott ...
"I say again-and I speak for, I believe, practically every member of the
Judiciary Committee-that if this section did legalize the secondary boycott
there would not be a man to vote for it. It is not the purpose of the committee to authorize it and I do not think any person in this House wants to
do it."
75. Mr. LaGuardia: "There is not an underlying principle written into
this bill which Congress did not enact into law back in 1914, when the Clayton Act was passed. Gentlemen, this problem is not new. Congress struggled
with it before it wrote the provisions into the Clayton Act in 1914 exactly as
we are trying to do today." 75 Cong. Rec. 5478 (1932). See also H. R. Rep. No.
669, 72 Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 7-8, to the same effect.
In New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 58 S.Ct. 703, 707 (1938),
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, said: "The legislative history of the act demonstrates that it was the purpose of the Congress further
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all surprising that labor should feel privileged to deny its services
when their effect will be to injure labor itself, and that such a
denial should not be emasculated by cutting off the force of organized effort, the source of its only real power. If this was the
goal for which labor was striving then it is reasonable to believe
that the purpose of the legislation here considered was to give
labor freedom to avoid division against itself by allowing full cooperation when a dispute with some employer arose. There need
be no conflict between such a purpose and the use of direct compulsion against one not a party to the dispute. If compulsion is
incidental to organized efforts against the offending employer
in defense of unionism, then it must be endured. Intentional compulsion of neutrals as a part of union policy and activity is another thing.78
The fact that there is no provision in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act dealing directly with the question of patronage as a particu-7
lar matter, such as may be found in certain of the state acts,
may be a further indication of a legislative intention not to protect
the secondary boycott. However, although the Wisconsin statute
includes in its protection "ceasing to patronize or employ any
person," it further provides in the same section, "but nothing
herein shall be construed to legalize a secondary boycott. 7 8 Evi-

dently the Wisconsin lawmakers felt that ceasing to patronize or
employ any person might be harmonious with the exclusion of the
secondary boycott from the protection of the act.7 9 Indeed, such
a position would be sound, for only when there is a combined
effort to injure the patronage of a neutral for the purpose of forcing him to aid in the struggle is the secondary boycott involved in
to extend the prohibitions of the Clayton Act respecting the exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts and to obviate the results of the judicial construction of that Act."
76. The position taken in several lower court decisions in New York that
the New York act does not make lawful any practice which was unlawful
before its adoption [Grandview Dairy v. O'Leary, 158 Misc. 791, 285 N.Y. Supp.
841 (1936); B. Gertz v. Randau, 162 Misc. 786, 295 N.Y. Supp. 871 (Sup. Ct.
1937); Weil & Co. v. Doe, 5 N.Y. S. (2d) 559 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Chapman v. Doe,
7 N.Y. S. (2d) 470 (Sup. Ct. 1938)], ostensibly has just been approved by the
Court of Appeals in a memorandum decision upholding the Supreme Court in
Remington Rand, Inc. v. Crofoot, 18 N.E. (2d) 37 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1938), affirming 248 App. Div. 356, 289 N.Y. Supp. 1025 (1936). See 3 Labor Rel. Rep. 389
(1938).
77. See note 68, supra.
78. Wis. Stat. (1935) § 103.53. Although the New York act has a "ceasing
to patronize" provision the New York courts have found that the secondary
boycott was not made legal. See cases cited in note 76, supra.
79. The Clayton Act itself has similar language dealing with the withholding of patronage.
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this kind of case. Even without language definitely excluding the
secondary boycott, the view that the provision dealing with patronage was not intended to protect the coercion of neutrals by
attempts to injure or divert their patronage might be supported
by the fact that the acts limit the protection given to advertising,
speaking, or patrolling, to conduct of this kind which is designed
to give publicity to the existence of or the facts involved in any
labor dispute, as we have seen.8 0
There is a possibility at least that the courts may take the
position that a case cannot involve or grow out of a labor dispute
unless the dispute is with the plaintiff. That is to say, they may
resort to the construction that if there is no labor dispute with the
plaintiff the action which he brings to secure injunctive relief
against striking or picketing aimed at destroying his liberty will
not constitute a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute,
thus interpreting the term "labor dispute" to mean such a dispute
with the plaintiff in the "case." Perhaps under the broad language used the only substantial basis for such an interpretation
would be the history of this type of legislation.81 However, this
method of construing the act would leave available to the neutral,
harassed and injured by a conflict to which he is not a party, the
remedy of the injunction to safeguard his business, and at the
same time would prevent the employer with whom the dispute
exists from thwarting the efforts of the union to compel him to
come to terms. As previously shown, the use of coercion against
a neutral has generally been treated as unlawful both with respect to the neutral and also with respect to the party in dispute
with the union. The construction here suggested would constitute a modification of this view, leaving available to the injured
neutral the customary modes of relief and merely depriving the
employer of injunctive relief to stop a program effective against
82
him.
80. See the discussion of this language, supra p. 305. Cf. Grandview
Dairy v. O'Leary, 158 Misc. 791, 285 N.Y. Supp. 841 (1936); Manhattan Steam
Bakery v. Schindler, 250 App. Div. 467, 294 N.Y. Supp. 783 (1937); Goldfinger
v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E. (2d) 910 (1937); and Canepa v. "John Doe,"
277 N.Y. 52, 12 N.E. (2d) 790 (1938).
81. For a detailed discussion, see Frankfurter and Greene, op. cit. supra
note 2, ch. 4, 5.
82. See Muncie Bldg. Trades Council v. Umbarger, 17 N.E. (2d) 828 (Ind.
1938); Blumenthal v. Feintuch, 153 Misc. 40, 273 N.Y. Supp. 660 (Sup. Ct. 1934);
Blumenthal v. Weikman, 154 Misc. 684, 277 N.Y. Supp. 895 (Sup. Ct. 1935);
American Gas Stations, Inc. v. Doe, 250 App. Div. 227, 293 N.Y. Supp. 1019
(1937); B. Gertz v. Randau, 162 Misc. 786, 295 N.Y. Supp. 871 (Sup. Ct. 1937);
Mile. Reif, Inc. v. Randau, 166 Misc. 247, 1 N.Y. S. (2d) 515 (Sup. Cf. 1937);
Weil & Co. v. Doe, 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 559 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Canepa v. "John Doe,"
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In further support of the right of the neutral, one may argue
that in the definition of a "labor dispute" the legislators indicated
conclusively that they intended to make legitimate the end sought
when the dispute involved terms or conditions of employment or
an effort to arrange them through representation or associationin short, to obtain a collective agreement. Except for disputes
falling within these categories, ends considered illegitimate at
common law remain so under the statutes. Now, as previously
pointed out, 88 undertaking to coerce a neutral is generally considered destitute of a legitimate end at common law because no
circumstances constituting a labor dispute with him exist. This
being true, the position of the neutral under the statutes might
remain unchanged. Of course, the above analysis is contrary to
the treatment of the Goldfinger case by the New York Court of
Appeals;8 4 yet the opinion does not foreclose conjecture concerning the court's real evaluation of the case, inasmuch as the court
permitted a practice which would have been valid under the
common law as found in that state, namely, picketing a product, and denied validity to a practice which, ostensibly at least,
would be valid under the statute, namely, general picketing of a
retailer."5 It is believed that the real difficulty here was in treating the act as applicable to the case notwithstanding the fact that
the action was brought by the neutral. The court's decision and
position generally would have been perfectly sound in the ab277 N.Y. 52, 12 N.E. (2d) 790 (1938). But see Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y.
281, 11 N.E. (2d) 910 (1937). Cf. particularly, Hydrox Ice Cream Co., Inc. v.
Doe, 293 N.Y. Supp. 1013 (Sup. Ct. 1937), decided on the same day and by
the same court as the American Gas Station case, supra. Davega-City Radio,
Inc. v. Randau, 166 Misc. 246, 1 N.Y.S. (2d) 514 (Sup. Ct. 1937), is contra to the
Mile. Reif case, supra.
See also, Union Premier Food Stores v. Retail Food C. & M. Union, etc.,
98 F. (2d) 821 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1938), where the court found the absence of a labor
dispute when the employer was willing to bargain with either of two rival
unions which the National Labor Relations Board might choose in a pending
decision as being entitled to represent the employees, and enjoined all picketing pending such decision. The dissenting opinion discloses the anomalous
nature of the majority opinion and its very questionable attempt to avoid the
operation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and to distinguish Lauf v. E. G.
Shinner & Co., 58 S.Ct. 578 (1938).
83. See supra, p. 280.
84. Goldflnger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E. (2d) 910 (1937). For a
federal dictrict court decision treating the act as applicable to action
brought by a third party, see Diamond Full Fashioned Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
20 F. Supp. 467 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1937). The opinion of the court is not at all
convincing.
85. The fundamental reason for this may have been that the court does
not believe that the New York anti-injunction law was designed to protect
the secondary boycott. See the concurring opinion of Judge Lehman In Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E. (2d) 910, 914-915 (1937), and the cases
cited in note 76, supra.
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sence of the statute, for the whole question would then have been
whether the conduct of the union was primarily designed to coerce the retailer into acting against the manufacturer or was simply an attempt to notify the public of the nonunion character of
the manufacturer's product at the point where the buying public
could best be reached. This problem could and should have been
resolved in favor of the latter theory-a desirable policy to pursue
whenever there is doubt.
CONCLUSION

The case history of labor's legal position in the employment
of its weapons seems definitely to indicate that while in modern
times the great majority of courts have been willing to protect
the workingman in his efforts to organize, and, through organization, to seek the support of all others when a legitimate dispute
with some employer was being waged, they have been unwilling to permit labor to force such support. Conduct designed
to intimidate others outside the immediate dispute, whether morally or physically, has been disapproved almost uniformly. On
the contrary, attempts at peacful persuasion have been protected.
Conflicting attitudes on the legality of picketing have resulted
from different opinions concerning its effect, that is, whether or
not it is intimidating. But whenever found to have this characteristic as practiced there has been uniformity in denouncing it.
Similarly any other method having a like intentional effect has
been treated the same. With a free people legitimate competition
is sacred. To destroy competition is to strike a blow at freedom.
In the economic conflict between employer and employed the
support of others is essential. For it both parties to the conflict
vie. It may be wooed and won but not compelled. This seems to
be the moving spirit of the cases. Difficulty has been encountered
in separating intentional compulsion from injury incidental to
cooperative support of the organization and to reasonably effective public appeal.
From a consideration of the cases, the feeling comes that
labor's major struggle has been to secure recognition of its
claimed privilege to use the entire strength of its organization
against an offending employer in order to bring him to terms,
and that labor has not been so much concerned, as a direct endeavor, with forcing the aid of neutrals. The penalty for going
beyond such a program and letting ambition impel activity aimed
at direct coercion of third parties has been the legal proscription
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of measures that, if carefully directed and controlled, might have
been approved as defensive. It is believed that courts should be
reluctant to destroy the power of organization-for what else has
labor?-under the guise of protecting third parties from coercive
practices. Certainly a local is no match for an employer having
great resources, and labor history teaches that action to bring an
objecting employer into line has frequently had its genesis in
threats of other manufacturers in the industry to refuse to renew
their union contracts in order to meet nonunion competition. A
situation of this kind calls for full union cooperation.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act and like legislation should be
readily accepted not only as protecting efforts to secure the right
to bargain collectively, without regard to the employer-employee
relationship, but also as making possible concert of action on the
part of affiliated labor groups against an employer who does not
see with the union on questions concerning terms or conditions
of employment, notwithstanding' incidental hardships to third
parties." At the same time, direct and intentional coercion of
neutrals, lacking the factors which justify coercion of an offending employer, should be denied protection-at least in favor of
the neutral-until experience has clearly demonstrated that such
a course is essential to the reasonable protection and advancement
of legitimate union interests. 7 That there is a great interdependency under our economic organization between productive and
distributive units may be true, but unless there is common control
the claimed third party neutral should not be identified with the
offender for the purpose of finding legal justification for coercive
8
practices.1
The proportionate interest of the individual consumer in the affairs of the nonunion manufacturer, assuming his
goods may be bought more cheaply, is as great as that of the retailer, yet should the exercise of his freedom to dispose of his
86. See Levering & Garrigues v. Morrin, 71 F. (2d) 284 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1934).
Employers, of course, are opposed to this practice. See "Employment Relations," approved by the National Association of Manufacturers, December
1937, reprinted 1 Labor Rel. Rep. 383 (1937), commented on by Gall and
Smethurst, Amending the Wagner Act: The Problem from the Manufacturer's Viewpoint (1938) 5 Law & Contemp. Prob. 306, 308 et seq.
87. See Grandview Dairy v. O'Leary, 158 Misc. 791, 285 N.Y. Supp. 841
(1936); Long Island Drug Co., Inc. v. Devery, 6 N.Y. S. (2d) 390 (Sup. Ct.
1938); Canepa v. "John Doe," 277 N.Y. 52, 12 N.E. (2d) 790 (1938); Geo. B.
Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n, etc., 155 Ore. 652, 63 P. (2d) 1090 (1936),
Sayre, supra note 3, at 700-701.
88. Justice Collin refuted an attempt by counsel for defendant to identify
the retailer with the manufacturer in his opinion in Goldflnger v. Feintuch,
159 Misc. 806, 288 N.Y. Supp. 855 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
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patronage as he may see fit expose him to coercive practices?8 9
On the other hand, to incidental hardships he must submit. The
final inquiry in cases involving coercion has never been more
effectively suggested than by District Judge Hough: "The priest
of Juggernaut may be glad that the car rolls over a personal enemy, but the car rolls primarily to glorify the god within." 90 Does
the "car roll" against third party neutrals, or is damage to them
merely an incident of labor's attempt to maintain its position
against the one who threatens its power or its cause?
89. Cf. Hellerstein, supra note 46, at 354.
90. Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. 111, 115 (D. C. S. D. N.Y. 1914).

